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Abstract Quinoa farmers in San Agustı´n, Bolivia face
the dilemma of producing for a growing international
market while defending their community interests and
resources, meeting their basic household needs, and mak-
ing a profit. Farmers responded to a changing market in the
1970s by creating committees in defense of quinoa and
farmer cooperatives to represent their interests and maxi-
mize economic returns. Today farmer cooperatives offer
high, stable prices, politically represent farmers, and are
major quinoa exporters, but intermediaries continue to play
an important role in the local economy. Meanwhile, some
farmers rebuff the national cooperatives and intermediaries
in favor of a denomination of origin and closer association
with local cooperatives. This article, based on 4 months of
ethnographic research, explores the reasons for the con-
tinued presence of intermediaries on the market landscape
and how farmers have worked to create a quinoa economy
embedded with fair trade values. Farmers demand stable
prices, flexible standards, provision of services, and
promises of maintaining the distinctive qualities of San
Agustı´n quinoa. They frame their trades in economic,
utility, and solidarity terms to reflect their livelihood
strategies, farming capabilities, and personal concepts of
fair trade. Meanwhile cooperatives, development initia-
tives, and intermediaries each argue that their particular
buying practices allow farmers to attain household goods,
credit, and cash for food and economic security.
Keywords Quinoa  Quinua real  Bolivia  Fair trade 
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A story
After a long, bumpy drive from Uyuni, we parked the old truck
in the plaza of Colcha ‘‘K,’’ a small town perched on Bolivia’s
southern Altiplano.1 Isabella 2 and her daughter slept in the
cab, leaving the driver and me to sleep under the stars and atop
the potatoes in the back of the truck. As dawn broke the next
morning, the townspeople slowly realized that an intermedi-
ary had arrived during the night. The plaza in Colcha ‘‘K’’ was
calm and chilly. Students were chatting as they ran to class and
construction workers meandered to their worksite on the
highway, but the town was still quiet. Breaking the silence was
Isabella. She called out that her potatoes were barratisima!
(very cheap) and her apples were riquı´sima! (very tasty). Since
six o’clock Isabella, a quinoa middlewoman, had been setting
up a small shop and was beginning her day of buying quinoa,
selling goods, and catching up with old friends and family.
Throughout the morning farmers came to purchase vegetables
or fruit, others came to sell quinoa, and still others chose to
hacer trueque (trade) quinoa for household goods. Farmers
brought 5–50 pounds of quinoa to sell, just enough to trade for
fresh fruits, school supplies, cancel a debt, or bring home a
small amount of cash.
After purchasing 10 pounds of potatoes from Isabella a
middle-aged farmer approached me out of curiosity. After
patiently listening while I explained my research project,
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he succinctly outlined an emerging reality of quinoa pro-
ducers in the region. Nearly all of the quinoa growing near
Colcha ‘‘K,’’ he said, had been destroyed by high winds
early in the season, but at least this year the llama herds
were surviving—30 % had been lost to drought the pre-
vious year. People were living off the profit from their
llamas, remittances from relatives, or migrating to find
work in Argentina, Chile, or the interior of Bolivia. He then
turned my attention back to Isabella and argued that
farmers should never sell to intermediaries because they
sell the quinoa to Peruvian entrepreneurs who then pass off
the Colcha ‘‘K’’ quinoa as Peruvian quinoa—an affront
to the quinoa farmers of Colcha ‘‘K’’ and to la patria
(Bolivia). He blamed local farmers for being ignorant about
the situation. They should defend their crop, he argued, by
selling to the local farmer cooperative, not intermediaries.
The local cooperative offers better prices and works for the
farmers’ interests. He then turned and continued home.
Introduction
Travels with and conversations about a quinoa middle-
woman indicate something important about the regional
quinoa economy in Los Lipez, a region in the southern
Altiplano of Bolivia. Entrepreneurial intermediaries,
national and regional farmer cooperatives, and a local
denomination of origin (DO) initiative compete for a rel-
atively stable quantity of quinoa by appealing to farmers’
multiple and divergent interests. This Colcha ‘‘K’’ farmer
makes clear that his own interest mixes a desire for raising
prices with the hope of preserving the quinoa’s local
identity. He juxtaposes himself against his farmer neigh-
bors who, from his perspective are apparently ignorant of
the consequences of selling to intermediaries and interested
only in their personal cash returns. This is one case of
many in which Los Lipez quinoa farmers translate profit,
household, and social interests into market decisions. In
turn, these market decisions construct farmer identities.
From the perspective of San Agustı´n, Bolivia, a quinoa-
producing town near to Colcha ‘‘K,’’ this paper is an
analysis of the various meanings and values that farmers
attribute to the three dominant market channels (i.e.,
national and regional cooperatives, intermediaries, and a
locally based farmer’s organization) and the ways that fair
trade and development are negotiated through discourse
and practice. Quinoa farmers in San Agustı´n make every-
day value judgments within the context of market channels,
the realities of living in an isolated community, and the
environment in which they farm. I present a case of quinoa
production and marketing in San Agustı´n to develop a
nuanced understanding of how farmers, cooperatives,
intermediaries, and activists construct a quinoa-trading
network. Farmers use quinoa-trading networks in San
Agustı´n to attain household goods, credit, and cash to
ensure food and economic security. Farmers mobilize
solidarity and group identity through unexpected alliances
and rivalries that are strengthened and performed via
market decisions. Finally, farmers create new political and
economic realities in their tacit support of development
visions, as represented by the three market channels.
In this paper I review established approaches to farmer
practice and agency. Then, after outlining existing recent
literature on the fragmented and fluctuating quinoa econ-
omy, I offer a case study of three competing and compli-
mentary market channels in San Agustı´n in order to answer
these questions: How do farmers create and manipulate
market channels to meet their different household, social,
and economic demands, in the absence of an effective
formal fair trade framework? How do farmer cooperatives,
independent intermediaries, and leaders of a denomination
of origin initiative defend their buying practices as con-
tributions to farmers’ livelihoods? How does this case
study challenge our assumptions of narrowly defined soli-
darity networks and the ability of small hold farmers to
create economic change? I analyze this by taking account
of the unique challenges of living in an isolated farming
community, considering the multiple ways in which soli-
darity is framed, and observing the different ways that
actors fulfill their visions of development. Ultimately, I
show that farmers’ ability to support or abandon buyers and
to create new market channels offers them a measure of
control in the market and enriches their work and trade,
expressing broad moral visions of the community and
nation. This analysis compliments Lyon and Moberg’s call
for an ‘‘ethnographically grounded examination of how fair
trade operates in practice’’ at the nexus of global markets
and local realities (2010, p. 15)3 as well of the work of
Jaffee (2007) and Bacon et al. (2008). In this paper I pri-
oritize the interface of multiple realities at the local level
and in so doing, lay bare the potential of non-fair trade
channels (e.g., private intermediaries) to create space for
farmers to make viable wider visions of development.
Local responses to global processes
The price for quinoa has steadily increased due to rising
international and local demand and relatively stagnant
production (Valdez and Bajak 2011; Romero 2011). The
‘‘quinoa boom’’ has been posed as a saving grace for poor
3 The values of fair trade being: fair prices that exceed production
costs, financing of social projects that benefit the community, pre-
financing for goods, long-term trading partnerships, minimum criteria
to ensure socially, economically, and environmentally responsible
trade (www.fairtrade.net).
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farmers, a threat forcing Bolivian consumers to abandon
quinoa for rice and quinoa milk for Coca-Cola, and a
pressure forcing farmers to adopt modern industrial farm-
ing practices (Romero 2011; Valdez and Bajak 2011).
These issues are not new. Anthropologists and economists
have long focused on farmers’ vulnerability to exploitation
by intermediaries and international commodity buyers.
For example, Roseberry’s examination of Latin Ameri-
can coffee economies went a long way to clarifying
‘‘preexisting and emergent fields of power’’ (1995, p. 8).
Power issues go beyond the ability to negotiate a fair price
and include the ‘‘occupation of space and transfer of landed
property,’’ the ‘‘position of regions within interregional
trade networks,’’ ‘‘location and development of roads,
ports, and processing facilities,’’ ‘‘mobilization and repro-
duction of labor,’’ and so on (Roseberry 1995, p. 8).
Roseberry’s focus on regional differentiation within power
relations and economic contexts represents a significant
step away from monolithic views of commodity markets
being controlled by buyers at the core merely extracting
wealth from the periphery. However, by focusing on power
relations and historical market formation in regional coffee
economies he underestimates peasants’ ability to affect real
change in the transformation of regional economies.
Literature on farmer cooperatives highlights farmers’
capability to defend their economic and political interests
in the face of market liberalization and exploitive inter-
mediaries. Mexican dairy farmers, for example, lost sub-
sidies, received lower prices for milk, and suffered higher
costs of production following the North American Free
Trade Agreement and the subsequent liberalization of dairy
markets. The farmers in McDonald’s study responded by
forming three farmer cooperatives to achieve greater
economies of scale in the purchase of inputs and sale of
dairy products and to exclude intermediaries from the
market (1997). The three organizations’ strategies and
member agreements resulted in varied levels of success in
increasing profit and filling sales contracts. However, some
dairy farmers decided to farm independently or become
wage laborers rather than become members. This differ-
ence in dairy farmers’ economic strategies brings into
question the exclusive importance of farmer cooperatives
to the interests and capabilities of all farmers in the region.
Farmers’ diverse livelihood strategies and multiple eco-
nomic activities necessitate something beyond or in addi-
tion to farmers’ cooperatives.
Farmers’ aspiration of removing intermediaries from
commodity trade, as seen in McDonald’s study, has largely
been emphasized by fair trade activists. The Fair Trade
Labeling Organization (FLO) has embraced farmer orga-
nizations, along with raising minimum commodity
prices, and environmental regulations, as the foundation for
farmer empowerment (www.fairtrade.net). The potential of
cooperatives to achieve economies of scale, foster direct
trading relationships between farmers and consumers
(i.e., cut out the middleman), and support democratic
principles have made them a cornerstone of fair trade
(www.fairtrade.net). The outcome of fair trade markets in
commodity-producing communities, however, has been
mixed (see Lyon and Moberg 2010). Coffee producers in
Oaxaca, Mexico, for example, found fair trade markets to
be ‘‘better, but not great’’ (Jaffee 2007, p. 232). Jaffee’s
analysis reveals a host of unexpected consequences of fair
trade, including reduced agricultural diversification with a
concomitant intensification of coffee production, increased
out-migration, and increased risk of food insecurity. He
also addresses the issue of intermediaries. Despite the
presence of farmer cooperatives that offer superior prices,
Jaffee (2007) finds that itinerant coffee traders persist in
Oaxaca as a ‘‘parallel’’ market to cooperatives.
Arce’s work (2009) on fair trade coffee production in
Guatemala provides a basis for understanding the standards
and relationships imbedded in inter-related market channels
that make up regional economies. His actor-oriented (Long
2001) analysis moves the focus of the dual activities of
cooperatives and intermediaries beyond a purely oppositional
perspective. In Loma Linda, a small coffee-producing town,
producers are divided between various marketing and pro-
duction strategies. A women’s group exports made-to-order
roasted coffee, but is opposed by men who fear that the ini-
tiative will distract women from household duties and work in
the coffee plots. Differences in household and agricultural
livelihood strategies further divide members of the coffee
cooperative over the decision to market organic or conven-
tional coffee. Other farmers in the community avoid the
cooperative and women’s group altogether by selling to
intermediaries because of flexibility in buying practices. The
divided market in Loma Linda, driven by farmers’ disparate
interests, challenges assumptions of the role of cooperatives,
fair trade markets, and the way solidarity is framed:
The different networks operating in Loma Linda were
the consequence of the fragmentation of large col-
lective groupings and the way how solidarity frames,
meanings and ideas of development were mobilized
locally to distribute resources and target specific
social segments within existing community groups.
These paths to fair trade generate different texts in a
context in which peoples’ life worlds become frac-
tured to embody a diversity of solidarity and fair
trade categories (Arce 2009, pp. 1036–1037).
Arce portrays the fractured Guatemalan community as a
life-sphere, a social entity in which actors are united by a
similar activity (coffee farming in his case) but work
towards separate modernities (Personal communication,
Arce 2009). The life-sphere concept (see Arce 2009;
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Ofstehage 2011) recognizes divergent farmer interests or
differences in available resources within a community.
Colloredo-Mansfield’s study on political and economic
action in Ecuador also addresses the diversity of economic
paths and actor motivations (2009). Artists, capitalists, and
activists in Otavalo, Ecuador, defend their interests against
outside hegemonic forces, including free trade agreements,
but they also contest their values and beliefs within the
community and in the local marketplace. Socio-economic
entities (e.g., cooperatives and communities) cannot be
assumed to have common values or interests. What is
unique in the case of quinoa farmers is the rapidity with
which these values and interests have been mobilized
through the market and the intensity of the social rela-
tionships between market buyers and sellers. In this fluid
market actors frame and reframe fair trade and solidarity in
different ways and this, together with different levels of
access to resources and markets, leads to divergent market
choices and a near constant re-definition of what is fair and
what is not.
The ‘‘discovery’’ of quinoa by consumers in the US and
Europe has increased the market price for quinoa
(increasing by 600 % from 2000 to 2008 alone) and this
has raised concerns of inaccessibility of quinoa for Boliv-
ian consumers, increasing concentration of the means of
quinoa production, and increased pressure on the fragile
Altiplano soils where quinoa is grown. Quinoa farmer
cooperatives in Bolivia have great potential to improve the
economic outlook and political representation of farmers.
Healy (2001), for example, uses the case of quinoa coop-
eratives in Bolivia to demonstrate that indigenous eco-
nomic initiatives can create meaningful economic change.
Central de Cooperativas Agropecuarias Operacio´n Tierra
(CECAOT), a national quinoa farmer cooperative,
achieved early economic benefits for farmers.
Ca´ceres et al. (2007) analyze the history of quinoa
farmers’ cooperatives in Bolivia within the frame of fair
trade. The authors reveal the historic formation of CE-
CAOT and the Asociacio´n Nacional de Productores de
Quinua (ANAPQUI), also a national quinoa farmer coop-
erative. The authors analyze the process of creating fair
trade connections and competing with private quinoa
exporters, but besides a comparative analysis of the prices
offered by different market channels, the chapter largely
disregards domestic markets for quinoa and, as with Healy
(2001), the role of intermediaries in trade. Instead, the
study focuses heavily on the relative economic returns of
the various market channels without giving attention to
solidarity frames and everyday considerations that farmers
take into account.
Farmers’ responses to global economic processes,
including founding cooperatives and participating in fair
trade markets, create change by increasing commodity
prices, reducing input costs, openly incorporating political
commitments, or challenging power relations. In light of
this, I focus on a central problem: how are ‘‘solidarity
frames, meanings and ideas of development,’’ (Arce 2009,
p. 1036) mobilized locally and expressed as alternative yet
mutually reinforcing marketing channels. This broad issue
resolves into three questions in southern Bolivia: Why do
farmers continue to sell to intermediaries? How is the
regional quinoa trading network constructed by quinoa
cooperatives, quinoa intermediaries, and quinoa farmers?
And, What are the implications of the commercialization of
quinoa and the differentiated market channels? In
responding to these questions I find that: economic activity
occurs amid different social, economic, and household
interests and values; differences and conflicts in and around
market decisions are not necessarily problematic, but rather
illustrative of alternative development visions; and the
differences between the market channels effectively create
possibilities for farmers.
The data for this paper is the product of 4 months of
ethnographic research in San Agustı´n, Bolivia, and in
markets in Oruro, Uyuni, Cochabamba, Challapata, La Paz,
Sucre, and Potosı´ (see Fig. 1 for study area). Research
utilized primarily ethnographic methods in order to address
actors’ meanings and understandings behind each market
channel and to understand the discourse of various actors in
and around the quinoa-trading network. Research was
carried out under the framework of the Actor-Network
Theory (Latour 2008) and the actor-oriented approach
(Long 2001) with the goal of ‘‘following the thing’’ as
suggested by Cook (2004). In the following sections I will
provide general context around the production of quinoa in
San Agustı´n before analyzing the positive and negative
outcomes of the practices of farmer cooperatives as expe-
rienced by diverse groups of farmers in the region. I will
then discuss two competing buyers for quinoa in San
Agustı´n, intermediaries and a denomination of origin ini-
tiative, to demonstrate the competing economic, social, and
utility claims at work in the local quinoa economy. To
close, I examine the fair trade implications of the inter-
acting market channels and analyze the relative power and
weakness of the farmers and buyers in San Agustı´n.
Quinoa production in San Agustı´n
Since the 1970s, the demand for quinoa has expanded from
isolated domestic markets in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador to
become a widely traded food in Europe, the United States,
Latin America, and Japan. This expansion is largely related
to the nutritional qualities of quinoa (Rojas et al. 2004) that
have made it a favorite of health-food consumers, espe-
cially vegetarians. Quinoa is high in protein, contains all
444 A. Ofstehage
123
essential amino acids, is low in fat, and is gluten-free. The
price of quinoa has risen dramatically from just a few
dollars per ton in the 1970s to over $1,400 per ton in 2009
and the market continues to fluctuate, as seen in Fig. 2. The
most commonly exported type of quinoa, quinua real, is
produced in the Oruro and Potosı´ Departments of Bolivia.
Quinua dulce, a smaller grained variety, is grown mostly in
the Central and Northern Altiplano of Peru and Bolivia and
is generally consumed locally.4
The French non-governmental organization, Agronomes
et Ve´te´rinaires sans Frontie`res (AVSF) has extensively
studied the impact of quinoa commercialization on pro-
duction practices of farmers (Felix 2008; Quisbert and
Valleur 2009). These studies have found a widespread shift
from integrated farming systems, including camelids,
polyculture, and fallow periods of up to 7 years, to a more
mechanized system with shorter periods of fallow, reduced
biodiversity, and increased use of tillage. AVSF has now
implemented a program to encourage farming communities
to adopt ‘‘traditional’’ and ecological farming techniques to
conserve the land and culture of quinoa production (Felix
and Villca 2009).
Other studies dispute this representation of quinoa
farmers as uniformly transitioning to mechanization and
question the dominance of cooperatives as primary quinoa
buyers. In its review of quinoa production, the FAUTAPO
Foundation presents a detailed picture of how productive
regions and micro-regions differ greatly in mechanization
of production, average land holding, yield, and market
access (Carlos-Aroni et al. 2009). Studies have found that
farmers continue to sell to intermediaries despite the
superior profit prices offered by cooperatives (Egoavil-
Arce 1983; IICA 1991; Pinget and van der Heyden 1994;
Ofstehage 2010; Risselborn 2011). Research also shows
that the majority of consumers in Bolivia purchase quinoa
through intermediary-based trade routes (Egoavil-Arce
1983; IICA 1991; Pinget and van der Heyden 1994; Borja
and Soraide 2007; and Montoyo Choque 2007). Pablo
Laguna (2011) documents still another fault line in the
quinoa economy. In his analysis of pioneering commercial
quinoa farmers, Laguna finds heterogeneous experiences
and behaviors, with some farmers living in provincial
towns, others conducting pluri-activity with mining, and
still others using knowledge from their days as migrant
farm laborers. Influenced by their different visions of
modernity, farmers face a conflict in solidarity frames built
around identity politics. Effectively, farmers identify as
either belonging to rival regional farmer groups or as
belonging to a broader coalition with a more or less unified
vision for the future.
San Agustı´n served as an excellent site from which to
observe the intermediaries’ and cooperatives’ competing
claims for the supply of quinoa as well as the various
farmer initiatives and interests at work. The Altiplano
community is home to 435 quinoa-producing families, of
which 254 are permanent resident families (Carlos-Aroni
et al. 2009). The town and the Los Lipez region are eco-
nomically dependent on quinoa production, llama raising,
mining, and tourism. Quinoa is produced both on the flat-
lands and on the hillsides in San Agustı´n, to a degree
insuring farmers against extreme weather. A dry season in
San Agustı´n brings low production and drought on the
Fig. 1 Map of western Bolivia
Fig. 2 Quinoa production and price (2001–2008). Elaborated by
author based on figures by Laguna (2011) and the Instituto Nacional
de Estadı´sticas de Bolivia (www.ine.gob.bo)
4 Various types of quinoa are also produced in Chile, Ecuador,
Argentina, United States, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere.
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lowlands where soil is sandy, but good harvests in the
hillsides because of the greater water capacity of the hill-
side soil. In rainy years the hillside production is more
susceptible to frosts while the flatland is likely to have
sufficient water and yield well.
Farmers sow quinoa by hand in August and September,
often using reciprocal family labor. During the growing
season farming activities are limited to plant protection—
farmers hang compact discs from fence posts to deter birds,
erect short fences to keep out rodents, and apply plant
extracts and ash to prevent insect infestation. The limited
amount of work necessary between planting and harvest
allows many farmers to temporarily migrate al interior (to
the interior of Bolivia) or to nearby Chile for work between
September and March. Others remain in the region to tend
to llama herds.
At harvest time, March to July, farmers manually cut the
quinoa using a short, curved knife and stack it in the field to
dry. After drying it for several weeks, the producers
remove the stems and place the dried heads of the plant on
a large mat where the seeds are separated by pounding the
mass with a large wooden mallet. The separated quinoa is
sieved to remove other plant material and then winnowed.
Farmers winnow by pouring quinoa through the wind,
allowing the wind to blow away lighter pieces of stem or
chaff. The resulting product is then separated into first,
second, and third-class quinoa using the same winnowing
method: first-class quinoa is heaviest and falls directly
down; second-class quinoa is carried slightly farther by the
wind and falls further from the center of the pile, and so on.
The quinoa is then stored in separate bags for each class
and variety until sale. A small amount is saved for con-
sumption and seed.
Some farmers argue that quinoa produced in San Agustı´n
(and Los Lipez in general) is produced in a more ecological
and ‘‘traditional’’ manner than in other quinoa-growing
regions of Bolivia. Lipen˜o farmers (farmers from Los Lipez),
for example, claimed that while producers from other regions
use tractors or other mechanical aids at nearly every stage of
production and harvest, Lipen˜a quinoa is produced with little
or no mechanization. This claim is not completely accurate—
farmers in other towns in Los Lipez depend on tractor power
and the use of chemicals and farmers within San Agustı´n use
different levels of mechanization—but it is a significant point
in analyzing the restructuring of the market. Farmers in San
Agustı´n and in other farming regions are not united in their
pursuit of ecological and traditional production practices. In
fact, a traveler I met from the Oruro Department lamented the
San Agustı´n farmers’ ‘‘stupidity’’ and inability to ‘‘modern-
ize’’ and mechanize, saying that this backward way of pro-
ducing was holding them back.
In 2002, the Fairtrade Labeling Organization (FLO)
finalized a set of guidelines to certify quinoa as a fair trade
commodity. The results have been mixed at best (Laguna
2008). CECAOT became a certified fair trade organization
in 2007; at that time the price of quinoa at Challapata was
$12.50 per quintal5 and the fair trade minimum price was
$40 per quintal. Needless to say, farmers and cooperatives
were enthusiastic. However, demand for fair trade quinoa
from consumers remained low and the cooperative ended
up paying farmers fair trade prices while receiving market
prices for sales. The cooperative was still recovering from
this shortfall at the time of research. By 2010, the market
price for quinoa had risen to $100 per quintal while the fair
trade minimum price remained the same, thereby signifi-
cantly reducing the price differential between fair trade and
conventional quinoa. ‘‘The problem with fair trade,’’
according to a CECAOT agronomist, ‘‘is that it isn’t fair
trade.’’ She protested the subservience of the cooperative to
the FLO inspectors and standards, the small price differ-
ential, and the lack of real connection between farmers and
northern buyers via fair trade certified quinoa. The coop-
erative is undergoing discussion with FLO to possibly raise
the fair trade premium for quinoa and new standards are
due to be released in 2012 (Personal correspondence, Pablo
Laguna 2011), but in its current state fair trade offers little
real change for farmers.6 In the absence of a working fair
trade certification for quinoa, many of the core principles
of FLO (fair and stable prices, linkages between farmers
and consumers, democratic governance, and opportunities
for economically disadvantaged producers) have in fact
become endogenous to the emerging regional economy
constructed by farmers, cooperatives, intermediaries, and
activists.
Quinoa farmers’ cooperatives in San Agustı´n
Quinoa markets in Los Lipez began to expand from local
bartering networks into more extensive commercialized
networks in the early 1970s. At the time farmers sold
almost exclusively to intermediaries who procured quinoa
for the Challapata market. Intermediaries in Challapata, the
central quinoa market in Bolivia, brought the quinoa to
markets throughout Bolivia, but primarily to Desaguadero,
a small town that straddles the Peruvian border. Interme-
diaries had a near monopoly on the market and were often
accused of using over-weight scales, under-quoting prices,
and generally treating farmers unfairly. Producers respon-
ded to this exploitation by organizing farmer cooperatives
and forming ‘‘committees in defense of quinoa.’’ Com-
munity-based committees charged intermediaries with
taxes and searched for market opportunities to bypass
5 One quintal is 100 pounds.
6 For more on the topic of fair trade quinoa, see Laguna (2008).
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intermediaries altogether. For example, in the 1970s a
committee from the region sent out representatives to Lima
to identify the destination of their quinoa and to negotiate
direct selling contracts with buyers. The group succeeded
in arranging a direct trading relationship with a buyer in
Lima, although they were robbed of their payment on their
return.7
Farmers founded two national farmer cooperatives,
ANAPQUI and CECAOT, in the late 1970s and early
1980s with similar goals as the committees, specifically, to
improve the price paid to farmers for quinoa, find inter-
national markets for quinoa, and reduce the power of
intermediaries (Ton and Bijman 2006). Today, each
national cooperative is made up of several local affiliates
who operate as procurers of quinoa and as local represen-
tatives for the national cooperatives. In the following
paragraphs I will outline ANAPQUI and one of its local
affiliates, Centro de Desarrollo Integrado K’uichi (CEDE-
INKU). The make-up and procurement strategy of these
two cooperatives can be taken as representative of other
national and regional quinoa cooperatives in Bolivia.
The San Agustı´n cooperative, CEDEINKU, was foun-
ded in 1984 to procure quinoa for ANAPQUI and to rep-
resent the quinoa farmers of the Enrique Baldivieso
Province. The cooperative is composed of farmer-members
who have equal voting rights and led by farmer-members
elected to offices. The cooperative’s workers (e.g., agron-
omists) are generally native to the community. Approxi-
mately 400 farmers sell to the cooperative, 40 % of whom
are particulares (non-members), however, the quantity
purchased from particulares is much lower than 40 %.
Particulares sell conventional quinoa, or more likely
organic quinoa that is uncertified, and receive a lower
price. This quinoa is sold locally. Members, on the other
hand, are under contract to sell 80–90 % of their first-class
quinoa to the organization and implement organic pro-
duction practices. Organic certification prohibits the use of
synthetic pesticides and fertilizers, but does not limit the
use of mechanization in production. Members are also
encouraged (or forced, depending on with whom one is
speaking) to attend meetings and capacitaciones (extension
meetings) in San Agustı´n and Challapata.
CEDEINKU procures quinoa from the countryside by
truck when there is sufficient demand from producers and
members are encouraged to bring quinoa directly to the
facilities in San Agustı´n. At the time of research CEDE-
INKU offered $1008 per quintal for members and $89 per
quintal for non-members. The cooperative purchases only
primera (first-class) quinoa. Farmers receive a voucher for
quinoa sales that can be exchanged for cash when the
cooperative has sufficient funds; at times farmers are paid
several months after selling their grain.
Reflecting the roots of the farmer cooperatives and the
community-based committees in defense of quinoa, many
cooperative workers consider their institutions to be bul-
warks against intermediaries and sometimes against the
farmers’ own poor judgment. Maria, an agronomist with
CECAOT, summarized the competition between coopera-
tives and intermediaries:
What the producers don’t take into account is to say
an intermediary goes to…today, let’s say, to the
community. CECAOT buys the quinoa at 700 Boli-
vianos per quintal and tomorrow or today an inter-
mediary arrives and buys at 720 Bolivianos and [the
farmers] know that they’re buying at a little more
[higher price], but what should be taken account of is,
for example, the intermediary… the balance is very…
overweight [that is to say, the scale undervalues the
quantity of quinoa]. It [the price per quintal] is the
same as when he [the farmer] is selling to CECAOT
at 700 and, I don’t know, a quintal and a ten more
pounds is selling at 720.9
A manager of another cooperative recounted a similar
case and highlighted that farmers often know when the
intermediaries are using overweight scales, but sell anyway
to procure cash for particular needs. He also pointed out
‘‘dishonest’’ and ‘‘illegal’’ practice of intermediaries who,
‘‘offer higher prices, right, they bring the quinoa to Desa-
guadero and cross [the border to Peru] and sell [the quinoa]
as Peruvian quinoa.’’ Cooperative workers defend them-
selves as fair and legal alternatives to intermediaries and
place themselves firmly on the side of farmers.
Quinoa farmers of San Agustı´n sell to CEDEINKU for
several reasons. The cooperative offers high prices—at the
time of research the cooperative paid members $29 more
per quintal than intermediaries. Cooperatives, although less
powerful than the mining sector or the cocaleros (coca leaf
growers), bring greater political power to the region.
Farmers also credit cooperatives for their historic position
in defending farmers’ interests against intermediaries and
their reputation for offering fair prices and using fair
practices. CEDEINKU entered the market at a time when
farmers were at the mercy of travelling, exploitive inter-
mediaries who left little investment in the community.
Many in the region, like the farmer at the beginning of this
paper, support CEDEINKU and ANAPQUI out of loyalty
7 Peruvian border guards accused the committee of having earned
their money in the drug trade and confiscated most of the earnings. To
this day, a number of farmers suspect the story is a fabrication created
to allow the committee members to pocket the money.
8 At the time of writing and at the time of research, one United States
Dollar equals approximately seven Bolivian Bolivianos.
9 Although I have no doubt that this scenario occurs, most
intermediaries offer a lower price for quinoa than cooperatives.
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and recognition for this. The entrance of CEDEINKU and
the national quinoa cooperatives not only reduced farmers’
dependence on intermediaries; it fundamentally changed
the strategies of intermediaries as they sought out a kinder,
gentler perception. I will return to this point in the pro-
ceeding section. The entry of cooperatives into the quinoa
market opened up economic and political space in which
farmers have gained a measure of political and economic
control over the trade of quinoa.
Despite the economic and political benefits of selling to
CEDEINKU, not all quinoa farmers affiliate. Some take
issue with the rules, regulations, and inflexibility of the
cooperative. Particulares often find the rules and standards
implemented by the cooperative too difficult to achieve or
‘‘no vale la pena’’ (not worth the trouble). Although most
farmers in San Agustı´n produce organic quinoa, many
prefer not to abandon the use of synthetic pesticides
completely. They argue that although pesticides are used
infrequently, they can quickly eradicate infestations when
needed and possibly save a crop from being lost. Others
object to having their farming practices validated by
another person. Finally, some quinoa farmers in San
Agustı´n produce only a small quantity for household con-
sumption. They sell to intermediaries when possible, but by
and large membership in a cooperative is impractical due
to the small and inconsistent amount of quinoa for sale.
Members also avoid CEDEINKU for its often-late
payments and high quality standards. CEDEINKU gener-
ally pays a higher price than intermediaries, but payments
are often made several months after a sale due to periodic
capital shortfalls. This can be devastating to some farmers,
especially at times when cash is in high demand. The
cooperative’s high quality standards represent another
difficulty for members. Export-quality quinoa is first-class
and organic; any quinoa that falls outside of these guide-
lines, including second- and third-class quinoa, can only be
kept for consumption or sold to intermediaries.
A different kind of concern about selling to cooperatives
harkens back to complaints about Isabella masking the
identity of Colcha ‘‘K’’ quinoa. A small, but politically
significant group of San Agustı´n farmers has argued for
CEDEINKU’s independence from ANAPQUI in order to
ensure that their quinoa is sold specifically as Lipen˜a qui-
noa rather than as Bolivian quinoa. From this group’s
perspective, the relationship between CEDEINKU and
ANAPQUI is one in which the national cooperative gains
access to some of the highest quality quinoa in Bolivia,
provided by CEDEINKU, and then mixes that quinoa with
that of other regions in order to raise the overall quality of
their exports without paying a higher price for the Lipen˜a
quinoa. The president of ANAPQUI explained that all
quinoa purchased from affiliates is kept separate and
exported separately, but he conceded that quinoa is
exported as Bolivian, rather than specifically from Los
Lipez. Farmers’ interest in the independence of CEDINKU
from ANAPQUI and the separation of San Agustı´n quinoa
has also led to the creation of a denomination of origin
initiative. The call for separation of Lipez quinoa is based
on the physical attributes of Lipen˜a quinoa (it is a larger
grain), the perceived social attributes of the quinoa (the
‘‘traditional’’ and ‘‘more-than-organic’’ production prac-
tices), and economic factors (the perceived greater use of
manual labor in Los Lipez requires a greater labor cost of
production).
A separation would allow the local cooperative to cap-
ture a greater portion of the export price by cutting out the
middleperson who, odd as it seems, is the national coop-
erative. It would also allow San Agustı´n farmers to capi-
talize on the higher quality of Lipen˜a quinoa and the
perceived demand for ‘‘traditionally’’ produced quinoa by
northern consumers. Some farmers believe that their voice
is not well heard within the governing structure of the
national cooperative they are concerned that their lower
production quantities and greater distance to processing
facilities in Challapata and cooperative offices in La Paz
reduced their power within the organization. Independence
from the national cooperative, some said, would allow San
Agustı´n to self-govern. However, CEDEINKU’s separation
from ANAPQUI would be a difficult endeavor due to lack
of water for processing, lack of relationship with Northern
importers and lack of agreement on whether it should
separate or not. The separation dispute indicates a conflict
of solidarity frames—one group framing all Bolivian
farmers together as a political project, another framing
Lipen˜o farmers and Lipen˜a quinoa together in opposition to
rival quinoa farmers and sub-standard quinoa.
The majority of farmers in San Agustı´n sell at least a
portion of their quinoa to CEDEINKU and few deny the
benefits that the cooperative has brought to the community,
but it is clear that the cooperative is not meeting the needs
of all members of the community, nor does it have a stable
relationship with all farmers. Over the next two sections, I
will discuss the alternatives to the cooperative to illustrate
the complexity of the quinoa market in San Agustı´n and the
different interests at play.
Intermediaries as partners in development and threats
to community identity
Isabella is a single mother in her late fifties and a mid-
dlewoman. She was born in San Pedro de Quilmes, near to
San Agustı´n, and currently lives in Uyuni—an economic
center and transportation hub of the region. In the early
1980s, Isabella began periodically travelling to communi-
ties throughout Los Lipez to sell food and other goods out
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of her well-worn truck. Her travelling market allowed her
to visit family and friends in the countryside and supple-
ment her husband’s wages. As the price for quinoa began to
rise, she expanded her business to collect quinoa in the
communities and sell unprocessed quinoa in Challapata.
After divorcing her husband, Isabella took 2 years off of
her intermediary business before making it her primary
economic activity. She now travels once a month to collect
quinoa and sell goods. She has expanded her business
territory in Los Lipez and now processes quinoa before
selling it in Challapata. Although Isabella’s story is unique,
her practices as an intermediary are generally representa-
tive of other intermediaries working in Los Lipez.10
In March 2010 I accompanied her on a trip in which she
visited three communities in Los Lipez: Colcha ‘‘K,’’ San
Agustı´n, and Copacabana. On a typical day during the trip
we would set up shop early in the morning and then wait
for word to spread that an intermediary (and a gringo
anthropologist) were in town. People would then come
throughout the day to sell quinoa, buy goods, barter, and
catch up with Isabella. Each purchase began with Isabella’s
appraisal of the quinoa’s quality and the variety—many
varieties of quinua real are produced in the region. Isa-
bella’s driver or I would then weigh the quinoa with a
hand-held scale, sometimes with a farmer looking over our
shoulder to confirm the weight. Once a price was agreed to,
the seller took cash, canceled an existing debt, or selected
goods of an equal value to take home. Farmers brought
mostly second-, third-, and fourth-class quinoa and often
brought just enough to exchange for goods (cleaning sup-
plies, school supplies, cooking utensils) or a few pounds of
basic foodstuffs (e.g., potatoes, noodles, rice, vegetables,
fruit, etcetera).
After the buying excursion, Isabella cleaned and sorted
the quinoa at her home. She sorted sacks of first- and
second-class quinoa mechanically and sorted lower classes
by hand to remove pebbles and seeds. After sorting the
quinoa, she sold it to an intermediary at the Challapata
market. From Challapata it could have gone in a number of
directions, including marketplaces in Oruro, La Paz, or
Cochabamba or quinoa-processing companies in La Paz.
Most likely, her quinoa was purchased by a mayorista
(large-scale intermediary) who brought the quinoa to
markets in La Paz and Copacabana before taking the
remainder at Desaguadero, at which point it would be sold
to a Peruvian intermediary.
The quinoa sold to Isabella was distinct from that sold to
cooperatives in quality and quantity. Isabella purchases
conventional quinoa, thereby opening up a market channel
to farmers who are not associated with CEDEINKU and
are not organic-certified. She also purchases all grades of
quinoa, in contrast to the cooperatives that purchase only
first-class quinoa. She does this for two reasons. First, the
availability of high-quality quinoa in this region is very low
due to the prominence of cooperatives and this leaves her
with little choice but to lower her standards. Second, Isa-
bella hopes that her willingness to purchase low-quality
quinoa will endear her to the farmers and perhaps earn her
a good reputation. Isabella also differs from cooperatives in
the quantity of quinoa purchased—cooperatives will rarely
purchase quinoa is quantities lower than 100 pounds, but
Isabella purchases any quantity.
The services that Isabella provides and her flexible
standards are intended to create a reputation as an honest,
trustworthy, and indispensible middlewoman. These strat-
egies are representative of the practices of other interme-
diaries working in the area, though there is certainly not a
single way of doing business.11 Itinerant quinoa traders
improve economic and food security by bringing relatively
cheap goods to isolated towns with little access to mar-
ketplaces. Staple foods in San Agustı´n are often twice the
price of the same foods in Uyuni and fresh fruit is virtually
unavailable—Isabella and other traders sell food at Uyuni
market prices and provide a variety of fruit.12 They also
improve the resilience of the local economy by providing
easy access to cash and sometimes providing credit.
Together with intermediaries’ ability to purchase conven-
tional, low-quality, and low-quantity quinoa, the services
that they provide can make them indispensible to a remote
farming community.
The relationship between farmer and intermediary is not
strictly utilitarian. In his analysis of fair trade coffee in
Mexico, Jaffee (2007, p. 77) recognizes that some inter-
mediaries are mistrusted outsiders, but that others serve a
‘‘vital function to the remote communities.’’ However,
intermediaries in San Agustı´n act not only as functionally
necessary, but also as community members and kin. Mid-
dlemen and women primarily compete with each other
through the strength of their reputation and Isabella has
cultivated her relationship with farmers since she began
buying quinoa and selling. She is known to keep honest
scales (not overweight), offer decent prices, and purchase
absolutely any quality of quinoa. She also spends time in
the field catching up with friends and family and
10 The practices of intermediaries working in Los Lipez are similar,
but not representative of quinoa intermediaries working in other areas
of Bolivia. The distance to markets and inadequacy of transportation
make the market context in Los Lipez fairly unique.
11 Another intermediary in the area commented that he doesn’t barter
or provide credit. As he said, ‘‘Se viene, se vende, se va.’’ (One
comes, one sells, one leaves.) Intermediaries are less likely to provide
services in quinoa-producing regions where farmers have greater
access to marketplaces and banks.
12 They are able to provide goods at Uyuni prices by purchasing at
Challapata, a more vibrant and centrally located market.
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re-enforcing the perception that she belongs in the com-
munity. She has even made efforts to learn Quechua to
reach out to non-Spanish speaking farmers. Her relation-
ship with farmers does not guarantee a sale, but it does
open the door for business. Farmers and intermediaries
mutually support each other through their market transac-
tions and often tight-knit social interactions. They build a
channel that connects farmers to cash and goods, urban
consumers to relatively cheap quinoa, while connecting
families in and out of the region through informal gossip
and passing of messages.
Of course, not all farmers in San Agustı´n value the work
of intermediaries. Like the farmer in Colcha ‘‘K,’’ some
refrain from selling to intermediaries because of concerns
that quinoa would lose its Los Lipez identity. Other
farmers do not sell to intermediaries due to lack of trust.
Although Isabella has carefully manicured her reputation in
the community to create a strong relationship with farmers,
some intermediaries confirm the stereotype of an exploitive
coyote that uses faulty balances, quotes low prices, and
capitalizes on marginalized farmers. Regardless of Isa-
bella’s actions, some farmers see her as an outsider who
threatens their reputation and threatens the strength of the
local and national cooperative. Here again, the dispute
between Isabella’s patrons and her detractors is a conflict
of solidarity frames. For some, she has performed her role
as local woman admirably and remains at least at the
fringes of their solidarity frame, for others she and other
intermediaries are imminent threats to their sovereignty
and identity.
Intermediaries like Isabella provide essential services to
rural communities by purchasing low-quality, low-quan-
tity, and conventional quinoa. They also threaten the ability
of cooperatives to set market prices and the ability of San
Agustı´n farmers to create a reputation for their quinoa.
After being superseded in the quinoa market by farmers
cooperatives, intermediaries have found a niche in the
market that is unexploited by the cooperatives and have
specialized in addressing unrealized farmer needs.
Founding a new model
As noted above, some farmers advocate for CEDEINKU to
independizarse (become independent) from ANAPQUI in
order to completely separate their quinoa. Activists and
farmers have created a denomination of origin (DO), a
registered trademark to protect a geographically distinct
and socially reproduced commodity, for ‘‘quinua real de
Lipez.’’ This initiative, which encourages Lipen˜o farmers
to sell their quinoa as Lipen˜a and prohibits outside farmers
from doing so, shares many of the characteristics of the
studies by Daviron and Ponte (2005), Bowen and Zapata
(2009), and Barham (2003)—a shared way of farming, a
distinct agro-ecology, and a definable territory. The DO is
expected to bring economic benefits, augmentation of
symbolic value, and possibly a greater political unity for
the region.
DO initiatives, like fair trade initiatives and farmer
cooperatives, are often presented as a strategy for farmers
to improve their returns from commodity production. Da-
viron and Ponte (2005) suggest the use of DO labels as a
means of adding value locally to coffee exports. Barham
(2003) takes a similar approach in her study of French
appellation d’origine controˆle´e (AOC) labeling, but
emphasizes the potential of geographic origin labeling to
re-embed workers in a commodity in response to global-
ization. Place-based certification of Mexican tequila is
another initiative with hopes for economic benefits, envi-
ronmental protection, and cultural survival, although in
practice few of these hopes were attained (Bowen and
Zapata 2009). Colloredo-Mansfeld and Antrosio (2009)
propose that the reputation of a place-based good, such as
Otavalan handicrafts, is based on a constant re-interpreta-
tion of symbolic value which is built on performed value
and can be appropriated by insiders and free-riders as any
other commonly held good.
The movement towards differentiation of Lipen˜a quinoa
is largely spearheaded by the Mancomunidad de la Gran
Tierra de Lipez, a socio-political organization, and the
Consorcio de Lipez, a consortium founded by the Manco-
munidad. In November 2009, the Consorcio was granted a
denomination of origin for quinua real produced in the
region. The Consorcio intends to add value to local prod-
ucts and promote an alternative local economy based on the
recognition of ‘‘tradition’’ and Lipen˜a identity through the
promotion of products, development of new products, and
the certification of products de Lipez (from Lipez). Lipen˜a
quinoa is described by locals, or at least by supporters of
this initiative, as fundamentally different from other types
of quinua real because of the more traditional and ecologic
production process and larger grain size. This distinction,
they say, merits separation and a higher sales price to
recognize the perceived consumer demand for these qual-
ities as well as the perceived higher cost of production due
to increased use of manual labor.
The DO label certifies the territorial origin of quinoa in
Los Lipez and all quinoa is organically certified. The
consortium purchases directly from local cooperatives,
such as CEDEINKU and affiliated micro-businesses in
communities throughout Los Lipez, many of them operated
by women, elaborate products, such as energy bars and
chocolate-covered popped quinoa. The products are cur-
rently sold in Bolivian health food stores and in a special
Consorcio de Lipez shop in Uyuni that caters to tourists.
The quantity certified is relatively small, but growing.
450 A. Ofstehage
123
The Consorcio supports the complete separation of
Lipen˜a quinoa from other regions’ production and there-
fore supports the independence of CEDEINKU from
ANAPQUI. This is seen as a necessary step to segregating
Lipen˜a quinoa from all others and is a primary goal of the
Consorcio. It encourages farmers to not sell to intermedi-
aries for the same reason—quinoa sold to intermediaries
will be mixed with other types and its special quality will
be lost. The farmers who are lobbying for CEDEINKU to
become independent from ANAPQUI, the farmers who
refuse to sell to intermediaries, and the Consorcio are not
necessarily united in policy planning, but do share the
opinion that quinoa from Los Lipez is special and should
be treated as such.
In light of the buying strategies and services provided by
cooperatives and intermediaries, the rationale for the
denomination of origin appears to be primarily the main-
tenance and transmission of the reputation of San Agustı´n
quinoa. San Agustı´n quinueros’ (quinoa farmers) defense
of the ‘‘traditional’’ and ‘‘more-than-organic’’ qualities of
their quinoa reflects Mauss’ (2002, p. 66) observation that
‘‘things sold still have a soul.’’ Indeed farmers are pro-
tecting the ‘‘soul’’ of quinoa and their farming practices
that are embedded in it. They are all fighting, in their own
way, for the establishment and protection of a cultural
commons (Colloredo-Mansfeld and Antrosio 2009;
Ofstehage 2011) built around the production of Lipen˜a
quinoa and for the framing of solidarity around it and
Lipen˜o farmers, excluding outside farmers and quinoa.
The fate of the Consorcio is unsure due to the difficulties
of competing with the cooperatives and intermediaries as
well as a lack of interest from some farmers in San Agustı´n
and, according to conversations with Pablo Laguna, a rel-
ative lack of interest in other parts of Los Lipez. As in the
case of intermediaries and cooperatives, opinions are
mixed regarding the denomination of origin; some farmers
are deeply interested in the initiative as a means of creating
an alternative economy in which local identity is valued
while others are interested only insofar as they gain
financial remuneration from the trade.
Re-framing solidarity on the southern Altiplano
Quinoa farmers of the 1960s and 1970s had only one
market option—sell to itinerant intermediaries—and as a
consequence they suffered exploitation through under-
pricing and underweighting. Since that time, farmers have
founded new institutions to guarantee higher prices, invest
locally, represent farmers politically, and offer straight
deals. Today, all three market channels, shown in Fig. 3,
fulfill a key role for at least some farmers and all three
suffer in comparison to another option in some manner.
Cooperatives offer and maintain high quinoa prices and
play an important social and political role in the farming
communities, but accept only the highest quality quinoa,
and some perceive the national cooperatives to be captured
by the interests of rival quinoa farmers to the north.
Intermediaries maintain low quality standards, offer flexi-
ble payment options, maintain close social bonds with
farmers, and provide cheap, fresh food; however they offer
comparatively low prices, mask the identity and distinc-
tiveness of Lipen˜a quinoa, and will always remind some
farmers of the exploitive intermediaries of time past.
Finally, the Consorcio de Lipez buys at high prices and
celebrates the special qualities of Lipen˜a quinoa and Lip-
en˜o farmers, but purchases only high-quality quinoa and,
on top of that, some farmers are not concerned in the least
with the celebration of Lipen˜a quinoa.
The contradictions of this economy are easily apparent.
Intermediaries are neighbors and co-parents for some, but
economic leaches for others. Cooperatives are both mem-
ber-owned, democratic institutions and vehicles for the
subjugation of Lipez farmers by their rivals. The Consor-
tium is insignificant and redundant, but also the only real
advocate for local farmers. This paradox, however, is only
contradictory if one assumes that there exists a common
vision of development within a community and a common
solidarity frame. This research indicates that actors’ visions
of development shape their own economic reality. Within
limits, actors are capable of performing their visions by
supporting existing market channels or, as in the case of the
Consorcio, creating new options. Farmers construct the
fragmented San Agustı´n market to meet their own soli-
darity, household, and economic needs, but farmers frame
solidarity differently and meet their household and eco-
nomic needs by different means.
Burke (2010), Va´squez-Leo´n (2010), and Arce (2009)
have previously challenged farmer cooperatives and fair
trade initiatives as either incomplete in addressing farmers’
needs, insufficiently democratic, or unable to overcome
existing structural inequalities. In Bolivia, Leo´n et al.
(2003) have documented how an initiative to organize a
farmers’ market in Oruro was largely unsuccessful because
of lack of interest from farmers and the high cost and risk
of transportation. Farmers’ cooperatives, fair trade initia-
tives, and farmers’ markets each have potential to create
fair and constructive local economies, but none is a pana-
cea for farmers. The situation in San Agustı´n is no differ-
ent. The face-to-face market interactions between farmers,
intermediaries, cooperatives, and activists, within the
context of the Altiplano agro-ecosystem, has made avail-
able a range of services, solidarity, standards, and prices
provided by the three market channels. No single buyer
satisfies all farmers’ interests, but all do offer something
irreplaceable and therefore contribute to farmer livelihoods.
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But how does this mixed economy translate to fair trade?
And how is solidarity, a foundation of fair trade relation-
ships, framed in this context? In the Bolivian Altiplano
farmers are disassembling and reassembling the compo-
nents of fair trade to mirror the different solidarity
frames, farming strategies, economic strategies, and
household priorities. Working with and against coopera-
tives, the Consorcio de Lipez, and local intermediaries,
farmers reveal the limitations of a narrowly defined view of
solidarity.
Fair trade activists stress solidarity and democratic
governance in their support for farmer cooperatives, but
farmers also share group identity with intermediaries and
the denomination of origin initiative. In breaking down the
values of fair trade—fair price, long-term trading partner-
ships, criteria for socially, economically, and environ-
mentally responsible practices—one can see that farmers’
demands are being met through the different quinoa buyers
in San Agustı´n. In my numerous interviews with critical
Lipez farmers the price offered by the Consortium and
CEDEINKU was universally recognized as fair. Farmers
forge long-term and meaningful trading partnerships with
CEDEINKU, ANAPQUI, and the Consorcio. Even Isabella
and other intermediaries cultivate long-term partnerships
with locals by offering services and convenience. However,
solidarity is lacking in some relationships in which it would
be expected. San Agustı´n farmers do not automatically
have close relations with either the national or local
cooperative. Some are not members because they feel that
they can better achieve their objectives through indepen-
dent farming, others do not join because their way of
farming does not translate well to the cooperative’s strat-
egy. Farmers who are involved with the local cooperative
are split between those who feel a strong sense of regional
Fig. 3 Major channels of
quinoa out of San Agustı´n
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solidarity (wanting to separate from ANAPQUI) and those
who have a sense of solidarity with the national quinoa
farmer movement (those who want to maintain the current
relationship with ANAPQUI). Therefore, some farmers
are closely tied to CECAOT, others are closely tied to
ANAPQUI, and non-members are unaffiliated with either
cooperative.
On the other hand, the movement to separate and dis-
tinguish Lipen˜a quinoa has fostered regional solidarity,
demonstrated in joint political action in the region, priori-
tization of the recognition of the ‘‘superior’’ qualities of
Lipez quinoa and Lipez farmers, and refusal or reluctance
to sell un-separated Lipez quinoa. One can also see notes of
solidarity in the relations between intermediaries and
farmers. Isabella cultivates personal connections with
farmers by purchasing low-quality quinoa at very little
profit, speaking Quechua, transporting low-price goods
from Uyuni, and participating in local festivals. Isabella
has made herself a sufficiently local and trustworthy buyer
for some farmers. The different ways that farmers frame
solidarity gives value to trade routes. A stronger sense of
regional solidarity, for example, may pit a farmer against
ANAPQUI and against other farmer groups, while other
farmers will self-identify as a Bolivian quinuero, writ large.
Lastly, intermediaries are also able to foster solidarity,
perhaps small ‘s’ solidarity, by acting the part of a local.
The application of fair trade and solidarity principles to
the quinoa-trading network recalls Appadurai’s (1986)
notion of constructed and changing perceptions of com-
modities. Just as things move in and out of a commodity
state depending on actor’s assumptions, the fairness of
quinoa trade channels depends on actor perspectives. The
very significance of fairness is subject to actor’s priorities
in commodity trade. One farmer, for example, may con-
sider his trading relationship with CEDEINKU to be built
on solidarity and an expression of his appreciation for the
cooperative’s work. His neighbor, however, may sell to
CEDEINKU solely because the cooperative offers the
highest price that day. Intermediaries are not necessarily
despised or simply tolerated, but in some cases they are
deeply trusted members of a community. In the absence of
effective fair trade policy, farmers in San Agustı´n are using
the various quinoa buyers to balance their economic and
utility needs, create solidarity links, and defend their
notions of value. The various market channels do not
function merely as ‘‘parallel’’ and separate, as suggested by
Jaffee (2007), but as inter-related sets of standards and
relationships which cannot be understood without
acknowledging their interactions and multiple meanings in
the marketplace.
Social value and farmer agency are more than just token
themes or contextual information in the San Agustı´n qui-
noa economy. Quinoa farmers create meaningful change in
the regional quinoa economy through their activism and
market decisions and in so doing they perform their own
realities. Farmers’ different social and economic values
play an integral role in their interpretation of market
channels, all of which fulfill the interest of certain farmers
and none of which is complete. Loyalty and solidarity are
performed in the quinoa marketplace of San Agustı´n in
which cooperatives, intermediaries, and the Consorcio de
Lipez justify their trades and farmers protect their interests
and the interests of the community as they are perceived.
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